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EXAMINING DIFFERENT REASONS WHY PEOPLE ACCEPT OR REJECT
SCIENTIFIC CLAIMS
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68 Pages
The current project was designed to examine how cognitive style, cultural worldview,
and conspiracy ideation correspond to various levels of agreement with scientific claims.
Additionally, the kinds of justifications people provide for their position on scientific issues and
the kinds of possible refutations of their scientific beliefs people are able to generate were
qualitatively coded and analyzed. Participants were presented with a short survey asking about
their level of agreement with scientific claims about biological evolution, anthropogenic climate
change, pediatric vaccines, and genetically modified foods. Participants were asked two openended questions about each topic, one prompting participants to justify their level-of-agreement
rating and the other prompting participants to generate possible refutations to their belief.
Participants also filled in measures of cognitive style, cultural worldview, and conspiracy
ideation. I predicted that analytical thinking style would be associated with overall higher levels
of agreement with scientific claims, intuitive thinking and conspiracy ideation would be
associated with overall lower levels of agreement with scientific claims, and agreement with
scientific claims would be a function of cultural worldview. Results showed that greater
agreement with all four scientific claims is related to a greater predisposition to analytical
thinking and stronger self-reported political liberalism. I further hypothesized that the frequency
of distinct categories of justifications and refutations would be predicted by level of agreement

with scientific claims. Broadly, justifications were coded as non-justifications, subjective,
evidential, or deferential, and refutations were broadly coded as denials, subjective, evidential, or
deferential. Results of chi-squared analysis revealed topic-specific patterns in participants’
reasoning, suggesting that people do not reason about scientific topics consistently. Different
scientific claims appear, instead, to be accepted or rejected for different reasons. For example,
evidence may be cited for one socio-scientific issue, but subjective experience or reasoning may
be used to justify others. Regression analyses indicated further the nuanced relationship between
explicit reasoning provided by participants and their agreement with scientific claims. Higher
agreement with all scientific claims was related to a greater frequency of explicitly referencing
evidence in some form, but other categories of belief justification and belief refutation showed
topic-specific relationships. Generally, findings from this research provide a crucial next step for
better understanding why individuals reject established science, as well as for developing more
effective means of improving scientific literacy.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Improving scientific literacy is a major goal of 21st century education (NRC, 2010,
2012), but the path to greater scientific literacy in the general public includes many challenges.
Recent polls and surveys find the general public is not particularly prone to accepting scientific
conclusions on major socio-political issues (Funk & Rainie, 2015), and that for some subgroups,
trust in science and acceptance of science has been decreasing over the last several decades
(Gauchat, 2012). According to one line of thinking, the primary source of resistance to science
stems from an information deficit in the public (Gross, 1994). If that is the case, efforts to
improve the communication of science to the public should result in a greater acceptance of
science by the public. The logic of this approach is intuitively appealing, but the results of
programs that attempt to address this information deficit are mixed (Miller, 2001; see also
Gauchat, 2012). Some topics for which there is an abundance of scientific information and
consensus, such as biological evolution and anthropogenic climate change, are still hotly
contested by non-scientists in the public and in politics. More information has not increased
public acceptance of science.
Currently, researchers examining the public’s understanding of science are moving
beyond a pure deficit model approach to understanding rejection of science. Instead, many
researchers are investigating the role of other individual difference variables and their
relationship to accepting or rejecting science in general, or specific socio-scientific issues in
particular. These variables are predominantly social or cognitive in nature, rather than
educational or knowledge-based. They include cultural worldview (e.g., Kahan, 2012, 2015),
political ideology and affiliation (e.g., Gauchat, 2012; Nisbet, Cooper, & Garret, 2015; Shen &
Gromet; 2015), cognitive style (e.g., Gervais, 2015; Lindeman, 2011; Majima, 2015), and
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predisposition towards conspiracy ideation (e.g., Lewandowsky, Oberaur, & Gignac, 2013b),
each of which will be described in more detail in the following sections.
Results from these lines of inquiry have provided important contributions that afford the
improvement of educational policies and science communication techniques. One limitation of
these research efforts is that they are purely quantitative studies utilizing surveys comprised of
true/false or Likert-scale questions. To better understand why people may accept or reject
particular scientific claims, it is important to conduct qualitative research that allows individuals
to elaborate on their position in addition to quantitative research to examine individual difference
characteristics that relate to acceptance or rejection of science. That is the purpose of the current
research. A better understanding of why people say they accept or reject science may provide
new insight into how to convey scientific information to the general public.
Demarcation Problem
Before exploring the prior literature examining individual difference variables associated
with acceptance or rejection of science, it is important to understand what science is.
Understanding what science is and how to distinguish it from non-science or pseudoscience is a
challenging prospect. However, a person’s understanding of what constitutes science may
influence what topics or claims he or she considers scientific. “One’s view about whether people
are adept at scientific thinking depends heavily on one’s view of what scientific inquiry is”
(Koslowski, 1996, p. 3). The challenge associated with defining science and distinguishing
science from non-science and pseudoscience is known as the demarcation problem. Interest in
the demarcation problem has recently increased (Boudry, Blancke, & Pigliucci, 2014; Still &
Dryden, 2004), perhaps in response to the current dialogues about specific scientific topics (e.g.,
climate change) between scholarly communities, the general public, and politicians.
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Science is frequently treated and characterized as a set of processes and methods for
investigating phenomena, both by scholarly communities (e.g., scientific, philosophical) and the
general public. These processes and methods vary within and between scientific disciplines
depending on the epistemic obligations of the discipline (Cleland, 2001; Cleland & Brindell,
2013; McComas, 1996). For example, theoretical aspects of disciplines such as chemistry or
physics rely heavily on calculation rather than experimentation (Bauer, 1994). Previous science
education standards, however, were more limited in scope with respect to teaching students
about science as a method of inquiry, focusing predominantly on “the” scientific method of
observation, hypothesis formation, and experimentation. This view of scientific inquiry may be
why some individuals reject the consensus view on contemporary “controversial” scientific
topics. The predominant evidentiary weight of some scientific topics does not bear much
resemblance to “the” scientific method that was taught in primary and secondary education for
generations. For example, historical field sciences, such as geology, cannot conduct experiments
on hypothesized events that occurred in the past. Instead, field geologists examine the results of
historical geological events, and exploit the fundamental cause-effect asymmetry to determine
which hypothesized events are most probable given the collected evidence (Cleland, 2001;
Cleland & Brindell, 2013).
However, science can also be characterized as a rich and diverse set of content areas.
Regardless of the processes one uses, some topics or ideas are not susceptible to true scientific
investigation. For example, Bem (2011) published a series of studies that purported to find
positive evidence for psi phenomena, such as precognition and premonition. The predominant
responses from the skeptical scientific community tended to criticize the methodological and
analytic factors of Bem’s work (e.g., Rouder & Morey, 2011). Failures to replicate Bem’s results

3

were used to argue that the notion of psi phenomena is, at best, problematic from a research
design perspective. However, as pointed out by Schwarzkopf (2014), well-established research
findings in thermodynamics about the arrow of causality mean that there is no reason to assume
such phenomena (i.e., psi) could possibly exist for which testable hypotheses could be
developed. Psychic abilities violate fundamental thermodynamic properties of the known
universe, and accepting the premise of psychic abilities undermines the foundation of the modern
understanding of causal relationships. Schwarzkopf’s reasoning rests on there being boundaries
of what can and cannot be considered scientific content. These boundaries are themselves usually
created, maintained, or dissolved through the results of prior empirical investigation.
A similar position for demarcating science from pseudoscience was articulated by
Pigliucci (2013). He suggests there are at least two broad attributes that distinguish science from
pseudoscience. These attributes are breadth of internal coherence and depth of empirical
knowledge. Internal coherence refers to the logical consistency among a set of propositions that
gives rise to the explanatory power of a theoretical view (see for review, Thagard, 1989). The
processes and contents of science could be seen as making up the depth of empirical knowledge
attribute. Theoretical understanding and internal coherence ideally form a reciprocal relationship
with the establishment of empirical knowledge. Coherence both extends and constrains the
methods and contents of a given scientific discipline, which themselves expand and limit the
scope of subsequent theoretical understanding.
Although the above review is necessarily incomplete, it provides a means to introduce
and define the construct of science for the purposes of grounding the present research.
Classifying something as science (or scientific) depends partly on the characteristics of both the
content examined and the methods used, broadly speaking. Therefore, science is a heavily
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constrained category, requiring both a theoretically appropriate content area and associated set of
rigorous methodologies that produce internally coherent explanations for natural phenomena
(Pigliucci, 2013; Shtulman, 2013). This conceptualization of science can be useful in examining
why some people accept scientific claims while others reject them. Acceptance or rejection of
scientific claims may depend on the methodologies associated with investigating that topic, the
content under investigation, or based on some other reasons unrelated to the demarcation
problem. For the current study, analyzing the reasons people provide for their belief in scientific
topics such as evolution, climate change, genetically-modified organisms (GMO), and pediatric
vaccinations provide a window into what characteristics of scientific issues are salient to
individuals who accept or reject scientific views on these issues.
Dual Process Models of Belief
Cognitive science research on belief has been aided by the recent incorporation of dualprocess models of cognition. Dual-process models posit that information processing can occur in
two distinct ways (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011). One mode of processing is typically
automatic, rapid, and based on heuristics. This is frequently termed System 1 or Type 1
processing. The other mode of processing, System 2 or Type 2 processing, is described as a more
reflective, analytical, and slower way to process information. However, these characteristics are
not always present when engaging in Type 1 or Type 2 processing. Instead, these features are
thought to just frequently co-occur with a more narrow and specific defining characteristic of
Type 1 and Type 2 processing: Type 1 processing is characteristically autonomous whereas Type
2 processing is uniquely capable of cognitively decoupling mental representations after
inhibiting autonomous Type 1 processing (Stanovich & Toplak, 2012).
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A dual-process framework has been utilized in multiple distinct lines of research
investigating scientific and paranormal beliefs (Bouvet & Bonnefon, 2015; Gervais, 2015;
Lindeman, 2011; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Lobato et al., 2014; Lobato & Zimmerman, 2015;
Majima, 2015; Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012). Taken together, findings
from these studies suggest that a greater predisposition towards engaging in the analytical Type 2
processing is correlated with less endorsement of scientifically inaccurate or epistemically
unwarranted beliefs. In contrast, a greater predisposition towards engaging in the intuitive Type
1 processing is correlated with a higher rate of belief in less scientifically or philosophically
coherent phenomena. This research implies that people’s beliefs about scientific topics may be
influenced by their predisposition towards Type 1 or Type 2 information processing.
Justifications for Views on Scientific Topics
The importance of understanding why people accept or reject scientific claims is
illustrated in the diverse research efforts to examine variables that may affect an individual’s
belief system. Equally relevant is research examining how people justify their belief system
about scientific issues.
Recent research indicates that college students’ justifications for their beliefs in scientific
and paranormal phenomena are not qualitatively distinct (Shtulman, 2013). In this research, 140
student participants were asked about their beliefs in six scientific phenomena (e.g., electrons,
evolution, genes) and 12 paranormal entities (e.g., angels, ghosts, karma). Participants responded
to five prompts, investigating whether they believed in the existence of these phenomena, how
confident they were, how many other Americans they thought held the same belief, why they
hold the belief that they do (i.e., belief justifications), and what evidence might persuade them to
change their mind (i.e., belief refutations). Open-ended responses to the questions probing belief
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justifications and belief refutations were coded along a hierarchical decision tree (see Figure 1).
This coding scheme began with differentiating responses that actually answered the questions
from responses that either clarified the respondent’s position (for the belief justification prompt)
or denied any possibility for evidence to change the respondent’s position (for the belief
refutation prompt). From there, justification responses were further sorted into those that
referenced internal, subjective rationales and those that referenced external, objective rationales.
External, objective rationales were further deconstructed into responses that mentioned
evidential justifications – such as empirically observable properties or testable causal effects –
and responses that mentioned deferential justifications – such as appeals to authority or personal
worldview cohesion. Analysis of the sample’s belief justifications and belief refutations revealed
similarity between beliefs in scientific phenomena and paranormal entities. Both sets of beliefs
were predominantly justified by deferential justifications and for both sets of beliefs the majority
of participants denied the possibility of their belief being refuted. Even though the methodology
of the study prompted students to think in terms of evidence, most did not provide evidential
reasons. These results support the idea that many college students may not perceive scientific
beliefs as having a qualitatively distinct, more rigorous set of epistemological commitments than
non-scientific beliefs such as paranormal beliefs.
For both scientific and non-scientific beliefs, many people do not appear to conceptualize
their belief as two distinct representations of the theory and any corroborating evidence, instead
combining theory and corroborating evidence in a single representation. That is, “evidence
serves merely to illustrate what one knows to be true, with evidence-based and theory-based
justifications functioning as interchangeable supports for a claim” (Kuhn, 1999, p. 21). As such,
people may re-state a belief as its own justification. If a single representation is used for both
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belief and justification for the belief, people may struggle to come up with reasons for why they
hold the beliefs they do and instead resort to circular reasoning.

Figure 1. Coding scheme used in Shtulman (2013). From “Epistemic similarities
between students' scientific and supernatural beliefs,” by A. Shtulman, 2013,
Journal of Educational Psychology, 105, p. 203. Copyright 2013 by American
Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.

Cultural and Community Ideology
The framing of scientific issues also matters for understanding why people adhere to the
beliefs they do regarding science. Framing affects how a topic is received (Levin, Schneider, &
Gaeth, 1998). For example, Barnes and Church (2013) examined the frequency of the terms
proof, evidence, establish, experiment, test, and trial in documents arguing in favor of
creationism/Intelligent Design (ID) or evolution. Their analyses revealed that proponents of
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creationism/ID were approximately three times more likely than proponents of evolution to
utilize cognates of proof (e.g., proved, proven) in their arguments. Authors arguing for
creationism/ID were also approximately three times more likely to frame the issue of evolution
in absolute terms, expressing certainty that questions regarding evolution and the origin of life
could be proven (and that the proof is entirely in favor of creationist/ID arguments). The
researchers argued that such a finding indicates there may be ideological group differences in the
epistemological commitments of science between proponents of creationism/ID and proponents
of evolutionary theory. As such, the reasons that individuals provide for believing what they do
about specific scientific issues may help reveal how they generally understand science. This
research also suggests that people who reject science may be more likely to frame their position
in terms of certainty or provability, in contrast to the probabilistic nature of appropriate scientific
inquiry.
Similarly, research also indicates that how scientific issues are framed affects how much
individuals affiliated with different political parties support an issue. Shen and Gromet (2015)
investigated how advances in neuroscience that influence legal and public policy (i.e.,
“neurolaw”) are received by the general public. In a preliminary study examining the public’s
current understanding of how neuroscience impacts the law, the researchers found that most
participants mentioned aspects of criminal trials such as lie detection or assessments of a
defendant’s sanity. In a subsequent study with a nationally representative sample of 1,010
participants, the researchers manipulated whether the question about acceptance of neuroscience
in the legal system was framed in support of prosecutors or defendants. The researchers found
that although the general public is predominantly neutral to the topic of neurolaw, how the issue
is framed reveals partisan differences in acceptance. In particular, individuals affiliated with the
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Republican Party were less supportive of neurolaw when the issue was framed as benefitting the
legal defense side of trials. In contrast, individuals affiliated with the Democratic Party were
unaffected by how neurolaw was framed.
Whereas Shen and Gromet (2015) found the public largely neutral on the topic of
neurolaw, perhaps due to the perceived complicated nature of neuroscience advances, similar
partisan divides in accepting science are found for topics that have seeped into cultural and
political discourse, including evolution, climate change, hydraulic fracturing (fracking), and
nuclear power (Nisbet et al., 2015). When presented with ideologically dissonant scientific
communications, more people engage in motivated cognition, regardless of their political
ideology or orientation, compared to individuals presented with science communications that
were ideologically neutral or favorable. Here, motivated cognition refers to the phenomenon by
which individuals selectively interpret information provided to them in ways that are congruent
with their prior beliefs or values (Kunda, 1990). That motivated cognition occurs for political
liberals as well as political conservatives suggests that the role of ideology in resistance to
science may depend on the specific topic being considered rather than a generalized resistance to
science. Similar results of content-specific partisan differences are found in studies investigating
the degree to which individuals value deference to scientific expertise in policy formation (Blank
& Shaw, 2015).
Further, the role of ideology and community identity may be more important to one’s
position on a scientific issue than one’s content-relevant knowledge. For example, historically,
distrust in science within the United States between political groups – Democrat, Republican,
independent – varies as a function of which political party wins presidential elections (Gauchat,
2012). Trust in science by Democrats and Independents has remained stable since the mid-1970s,
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whereas for Republicans trust in science falls sharply with the election of conservative
Republican presidents. Rejection of science and endorsement of pseudoscience is also predicted
by religious affiliation, with religious participants showing a higher level of rejection of science
and acceptance of pseudoscience than non-religious participants (Lobato et al., 2014). Kahan
(2012, 2015) has argued that discussions of certain scientific topics, such as climate change, are
tightly associated with one’s cultural identity, including religious or political affiliation. This
association between a particular opinion or belief about the issue of climate change and one’s
cultural identity has complicated the transmission of relevant scientific data, as well as the
measurement of the public’s understanding of scientific topics, because it results in individuals
engaging in a form of motivated cognition that Kahan (2015; Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans,
& Rachlinski, 2012) refers to as cultural cognition. Cultural cognition manifests itself in
individuals’ attempts to establish congruence between the commitments of groups they belong to
and the perception of related facts. Group identity is more personally salient, resulting in the
perception of related facts in a manner that fits with the identity.
Kahan and colleagues (Kahan & Braman, 2006; Kahan et al., 2012) argue that cultural
cognition is a combination of two orthogonal dimensions: individualism-communitarianism and
hierarchy-egalitarianism. A high individualistic worldview promotes the expectation that people
should be free to regulate themselves in the pursuits of their own needs. A high communitarian
worldview promotes the needs of the community as superseding the needs of individuals, the
goal of which is to develop a society that affords opportunities for individual success. A high
hierarchical worldview seeks to protect traditional authority and role stratification. A high
egalitarian worldview denies the value of role stratification, seeing it as inherently risking society
falling victim to the actions of private industry and to the traditional prejudices of authority.
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Where individuals align on these two dimensions influences how information is filtered and
interpreted, resulting in occasions where two people of opposing cultural worldviews can view
the same information yet come to wildly incongruent, potentially antagonistic, conclusions.
Thus, it would be unsurprising if people provide justifications for their scientific beliefs by
referencing either a culture or community they belong to or a culture or community whose values
they oppose.
Conspiracy Ideation
Research has found that the degree to which individuals accept science is negatively
associated with acceptance of conspiracy theories (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberaur, 2013a;
Lewandowsky et al., 2013b; Lobato et al., 2014; Lobato & Zimmerman, 2015). Conspiracy
ideation is generally regarded as a self-sustaining worldview comprised of alternative
explanations for large-scale events endorsed by individuals who harbor a general distrust in
recognized authorities, particularly governments (Goertzel, 1994; Wood, Douglas, Sutton, 2011).
It is not surprising, then, that conspiracy theorists also tend to reject the conclusions of
mainstream scientific authorities (e.g., pharmaceutical companies, the Food and Drug
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency) on issues ranging from climate change to
vaccination safety. The association between conspiracy ideation and rejection of science suggests
that individuals prompted to justify their beliefs on specific scientific issues may allude to the
possibility of conspiracies.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The above broad overview of the nature of science, dual-process models of cognition,
belief justifications, cultural worldview and ideology, and conspiracy ideation provide a
necessary grounding for the present research. Qualitative measures will be analyzed in
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conjunction with quantitative measures to explore the relationship between select individual
difference variables found relevant to scientific literacy, level of agreement with scientific
claims, and justifications provided for those beliefs about scientific claims.
The first research question this research aims to answer is: Which individual difference
characteristics predict acceptance or rejection of scientific claims? Based on the literature
reviewed above, I hypothesized that cognitive style, cultural worldview (including political
ideology and religiosity), and predisposition to conspiracy ideation would influence individuals’
level of agreement with scientific claims about evolution, climate change, GMO safety, and
vaccine safety. Specifically, I hypothesized that:
(H1a) A greater predisposition towards an analytical, Type 2 cognitive style would
predict a higher level of agreement with scientific claims.
(H1b) A greater predisposition towards an intuitive, Type 1 cognitive style would predict
a lower level of agreement with scientific claims.
(H1c) A greater predisposition to conspiracy ideation would predict a lower level of
agreement with scientific claims.
(H1d) Stronger political conservatism would predict a lower level of agreement with
scientific claims about evolution and climate change relative to level of agreement with scientific
claims about vaccine and GMO safety.
(H1e) Stronger political liberalism would predict a lower level of agreement with
scientific claims about vaccine and GMO safety relative to level of agreement with scientific
claims about evolution and climate change.
(H1f) More frequent attendance of religious services would predict a lower level of
agreement with scientific claims about evolution.
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The second research question: What reasons do people provide when asked to justify
their acceptance or rejection of scientific claims? Put another way, when considering the various
categories of reasons an individual may have for believing as he or she does (e.g., cultural
identity, perceptions of the nature of science, evidence), how do individuals differ as a function
of their level of agreement with scientific claims? Shtulman’s (2013) research suggests that
justifications provided for scientific and paranormal beliefs are qualitatively similar. However,
his research examined only college undergraduates and did not have a sufficient number of
participants who rejected scientific claims, making a comparison between those who accept
scientific claims and those who reject scientific claims difficult. Likewise, participants in his
study were asked about the existence or non-existence of both scientific and paranormal
phenomena, whereas in the current research I examine participant responses to scientific
conclusions.
My hypothesis was, broadly, that there would be significant differences in the proportion
of scientifically and philosophically acceptable justifications that participants provide.
Specifically, I hypothesized:
(H2a) There would be fewer scientifically or philosophically acceptable justifications
compared to justifications that are not scientifically or philosophically acceptable across all
topics and levels of agreement with scientific claims.
(H2b) Higher levels of agreement with scientific claims would predict more frequent
scientifically or philosophically acceptable justifications.
(H2c) Participants’ justifications would be predicted by their cultural worldview along the
individualistic-egalitarianism and hierarchical-communitarian dimensions.
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The third research question the current research was designed to answer is: Do
individuals who accept scientific claims differ from individuals who reject scientific claims in
their ability to consider challenges to their belief? Embedded in this research question is the
possibility that some individuals may be unable or unwilling to consider that sufficient evidence
could be presented to challenge their position on a subject. As such, there are two general
hypotheses to consider. One concerns the possibility that participants will not be able to generate
refutations or challenges to their position on scientific issues:
(H3) The most common response to the belief refutation questions would be that there is
no reason the participant can think of to challenge his or her position on the issue.
The final hypothesis concerns individuals who are able to generate reasons that challenge
their level of agreement with the scientific claims. For these individuals, I hypothesized that
there would be significant differences in the proportion of scientifically and philosophically
acceptable justifications that participants provide. Specifically, I hypothesized that:
(H4a) There would be fewer references to scientifically or philosophically acceptable
refutations compared to refutations that are not scientifically or philosophically acceptable across
all topics and level of agreement with scientific claims.
(H4b) Higher levels of agreement with scientific claims would predict more frequent
references to scientifically or philosophically acceptable refutations.
(H4c) Participants’ refutations would be predicted by their worldview along the
individualistic-egalitarianism and hierarchical-communitarian dimensions.

15

CHAPTER II: METHOD
Participants
The original sample included 305 participants. After excluding participants who failed
attention checks, and multiple data sets that originated from the same IP address, the final sample
consisted of 244 participants with data that could be subjected to quantitative analysis and 239
participants with data that could be subjected to qualitative analysis.
Participants were recruited from the Illinois State University Psychology Department
SONA Systems participant pool (N = 157), and the Illinois State University Computer
Infrastructure and Support Services (CISS) system (N = 87). Participants recruited via SONA
systems were compensated via course credit. Participants recruited via CISS were directed to a
separate survey where they could enter their e-mail address to be entered into a raffle for a $25
Amazon.com gift card.
A preliminary power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner,
2007) with effect sizes from previous research (Lobato et al., 2014; Lobato & Zimmerman,
2015) calculated a minimum sample size of 138 participants for a predicted effect size f2 = .15, α
= .05, and power (1 – β) = .95.
Materials
A survey was designed using the Qualtrics online survey software
(http://www.qualtrics.com). The survey included a brief description of four scientific claims, and
participants were asked to report their level of agreement with each using a six-point rating scale.
Following that, participants were asked two open-ended questions designed to assess their
justifications for their position and what they think about the possibility of disconfirming
evidence for their position (see Appendix A).
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The four topic areas for this research are: (1) biological evolution; (2) anthropogenic
climate change; (3) genetically modified foods; and (4) vaccine efficacy. Each topic was selected
for its prominence in contemporary discussions about the general public’s level of scientific
literacy within scholarly disciplines, political discourse, and popular culture at large. Due to the
prevalence of these topics in both political and popular discourse compared to other scientific
topics, there exists a large disconnect between how the general public feels about these issues
compared to how the relevant scientific communities feel about them. For example, although
88% of scientists from the American Association for the Advancement of Science agree that
genetically modified foods are safe to eat, only 37% of adults in the United States agree with that
conclusion (Funk & Rainie, 2015). Additionally, these topics were selected because of the
stereotypical media portrayal of two topics, evolution and climate change, as being resisted more
by political conservatives whereas the other two topics, GMO and vaccine safety, are portrayed
as more likely to be resisted by political liberals.
The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI, see Appendix B, Norris & Epstein, 2011) is a
measure of predisposition towards Type 1 and Type 2 thinking. This version of the REI has four
subscales (Rational, Imaginative, Emotional, Intuitive), but only the Rational and Intuitive
subscales were analyzed for this study. Internal reliability for these subscales was found
acceptable (α = .85 for the Rational subscale; α = .72 for the Intuitive subscale).
The Cultural Worldview Scale (CWS, see Appendix C; Kahan et al., 2012) is a measure
of cultural worldview along the dimensions of Individualism-Communitarianism and HierarchyEgalitarianism. Internal reliability for these subscales was deemed unacceptable (α = .52 for the
Individualism-Communitarianism subscale; α = .59 for the Hierarchy-Egalitarianism subscale).
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As a result, this scale was not used in any analyses. For a full explanation of why, and possible
reasons why reliability was so low, see Chapter IV: General Discussion.
The Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ; see Appendix D; Bruder, Haffke,
Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013) is a measure of predisposition towards conspiracy ideation.
Internal reliability for this scale was found acceptable (Cronbach’s α = .74).
Lastly, a demographics questionnaire was administered asking about age, gender identity,
religious affiliation, frequency of religious service attendance, political ideology, and political
affiliation (see Appendix E).
Procedure
Participants were presented with a survey asking them to rate their level of agreement
with four scientific claims on a 6-point Likert scale. After providing their level of agreement,
participants were then asked to provide typed responses to two open-ended questions about their
justification for, and possible refutations of, their position on each of the four topics.
Specifically, to investigate what reasons participants use to justify their position, they were
asked, “What are your reasons for your position on this topic?” To investigate what reasons, if
any, participants can imagine that could challenge their position, participants were asked, “What
possible reasons can you think of that would change your position on [topic]?” Participants were
then asked to complete the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Norris & Epstein, 2011), the
Cultural Worldview Scale (Kahan et al., 2012), and the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire
(Bruder, et al., 2013).
Presentation of the survey of scientific claims and the individual difference
questionnaires were counterbalanced across participants. It is possible that being asked to reflect
on one’s reasons for their beliefs may engage metacognitive processes (Kuhn, 2000), influencing
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how participants respond to the individual difference questionnaires. Likewise, it is possible that
the individual difference questionnaires may prime participants to already be thinking in terms of
their intuitions, their cultural worldview, or conspiracies, influencing what kinds of justifications
they may provide when prompted to. Finally, participants filled out a demographics
questionnaire.
Coding Justifications and Refutations
From the 239 participants who provided responses to any of the two open-ended
questions for the four topics, there was a total of 1,425 responses to the justification question
(324 for the Evolution item, 344 for the Climate Change item, 395 for the GMO item, and 362
for the Vaccine item). Participants provided a total of 967 responses to the refutation question
(247 for the Evolution item, 240 for the Climate Change item, 239 for the GMO item, and 241
for the Vaccine item).
A coding scheme was developed guided by the grounded theory approach to qualitative
research (Corbin & Strauss, 2014). Grounded theory is an integrated analytical approach that
“allows researchers to identify relevant concepts, validate them, and explore them more fully in
terms of their properties and dimensions” (p. 69). A preliminary coding scheme was developed
in anticipation of participant responses based on a review of the relevant literatures on the
science, history, and philosophy of science (e.g., Boudry & Braeckman, 2011, 2012), as well as
the research scientific literacy and scientific thinking (e.g., Kuhn, 2009; Munro, 2010;
Zimmerman, Bisanz, & Bisanz, 1998; Shtulman, 2013) summarized earlier, and personal
communications with scholarly experts on scientific literacy (e.g., C. Zimmerman). This
preliminary scheme was modified iteratively throughout the coding process (see Appendix F for
the final coding scheme).
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The codes developed for the present data were also categorized into “higher-order”
categories in line with the coding scheme developed by Shtulman (2013), to allow for
comparisons between those findings and the present study. The coding scheme from Shtulman
for belief justifications included the four following codes: Non-justifications, Subjective
justifications, Evidential justifications, and Deferential justifications. From the present coding
scheme, I combined several codes to fit with that coding scheme, in accordance with how
Shtulman described each category. Non-justifications included the following codes:
Clarifications/Qualifications, Don’t Know, No Answer (empty response), and None (explicitly
stated). Subjective justifications included the following codes: Logical, Moral, Religious,
Cultural Identity, Experience, Belief-based/Circular, Conspiracy Ideation, Controversy, Natural,
Personal Choice, Knowledge/Education, and Indifference/Don’t Care. Evidential justifications
included the following codes: Empirical – Data/Evidence, Empirical – mechanism. Deferential
justifications included the following codes: Authority – Scientist/Science, Authority –
Teacher/Class/Textbook, and Authority – Other. The coding scheme from Shtulman for belief
refutations included the four following codes: Denial, Subjective refutations, Evidential
refutations, and Deferential refutations. From the present coding scheme, I combined several
codes to fit with that coding scheme, in accordance with how Shtulman described each category.
Denial included only the following code: None (explicitly stated). Subjective refutations
included the following codes: Logical, Moral, Religious, Cultural Identity, Experience, Beliefbased/Circular, Conspiracy Ideation, Controversy, Natural, Personal Choice,
Knowledge/Education, Indifference/Don’t Care, Counterfactual Hindsight Bias, and Answering
for Others. Evidential justifications included the following codes: Empirical – Data/Evidence,
Empirical – mechanism, Empirical – Unrealistic, and Empirical - Methodological. Deferential
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justifications included the following codes: Authority – Scientist/Science, Authority –
Teacher/Class/Textbook, and Authority – Other.
Two coders (E.L. and C.Z.) coded 100% of the data. Initial inter-rater reliability was low
(Cohen’s κ for Evolution items = .61; Climate Change items = .67, GMO items = .58; Vaccines
items = .52. This low initial reliability was likely caused by human error due to the number of
responses (N = 1,912 participant responses comprising 2,392 coded segments), the number of
codes (21 justification codes, 25 refutation codes), and the iterative nature of the coding scheme.
Some codes emerged late in the coding process and coders’ revisions sometimes failed to
account for the new codes (e.g., failure to remove prior, less accurate codes for an item). All
disagreements were resolved by discussion.
It should be noted that the coding scheme as presently described could have been parsed
apart even further. In particular, codes were agnostic to valence. For instance, a response
segment could get a code for appealing to evidence by claiming evidence exists to support the
scientific claim or by claiming evidence does not exist to support the scientific claim. This level
of specification was unnecessary to address the hypotheses listed above, therefore coding the
open-ended responses at that level of specification was not done at this time. In the same vein,
the coding scheme does not acknowledge correctness or incorrectness of specific statements of
fact. In addition to this being unnecessary for addressing the hypotheses, I lack sufficient
expertise in each of the four scientific domains to be able to determine with high confidence if
participants’ response were factually correct or not.
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CHAPTER III: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for level of agreement with the four scientific
claims, and scores for each of the individual difference measures and relevant demographic
information. As noted in the Materials section of Chapter II, the Cultural Worldview Scale
subscales for Hierarchy-Egalitarianism and Individualism-Communitarianism failed to reach
acceptable standards of internal reliability (Cronbach’s α = .59 and .52, respectively) and was
therefore excluded from analysis (thus, H2c and H4c were unable to be examined). Table 2 shows
the Pearson Product Moment Correlations between the remaining variables (i.e., the four
scientific items, the individual difference characteristics, and the demographic variables).

Table 1
Mean Level of Agreement with the Four Scientific
Claims, and Mean Scores on the Individual Difference
Characteristics
Mean
SD
Range
Conspiracy Mentality
7.66
1.48
1-11
REI - Rational
3.66
0.58
1-5
REI - Intuitive
3.57
0.48
1-5
Religious Services
2.62
1.44
1-6
Political Ideology*
3.67
1.82
1-7
Evolution
4.38
1.48
1-6
Climate Change
4.37
1.45
1-6
GMO
4.32
1.53
1-6
Vaccines
4.33
1.48
1-6
Note. * Forty participants were removed from this
analysis because their self-reported political ideology
was not along the liberal-conservative spectrum.
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Table 2
Pearson Product Moment Correlations

1. Evolution
2. Climate
Change
3. GMO
4. Vaccine
5. CMQ
6. REI-R
7. REI-I
8. Religiosity
9. Political
Ideology
Note. * p < .05

2
0.02

3
0.20*
-0.13*

4
0.07
0.13*

5
-0.18*
-0.15*

6
0.23*
0.15*

7
-0.13*
-0.10

8
-0.08
-0.05

9
-0.21*
-0.09

0.15*

-0.03
-0.13

0.19*
0.17*
-0.03

-0.08
-0.11
0.24*
-0.11

-0.13
-0.07
-0.06
0.05
-0.09

-0.28*
-0.23*
0.12
-0.08
0.05
0.31*

GMO = genetically modified organism; CMQ = Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire;
REI-R = Rational-Experiential Inventory, Rational Subscale; REI-I = RationalExperiential Inventory, Intuitive Subscale
Political Ideology scored on a 1-7 Likert scale where 1 is Strongly Liberal and 7 is
Strongly Conservative

Predictors of Agreement with Scientific Claims
Canonical correlation analysis was used to assess the relationship between agreement
with scientific statements and the individual difference and demographic variables. This
technique allows for the analysis of the relationship between two sets of variables. In canonical
analysis, synthetic variates for the set of predictor variables and the set of outcome variables are
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created and analyzed to generate “the highest correlation with the predicted value” of each set of
variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 567).
The full model across functions was significant, Wilks’s λ = .7, F(20, 641.1) = 3.68, p <
0.001, producing four functions with squared canonical correlations of .28, .03, .01, and .001,
respectively. Wilks’s λ is a measure of unexplained variance, with 1 – λ representing how much
variance is explained by the full model. Therefore, the full model with four functions explained
30% of the variance, although only the first function, explaining 92.51% of the explained
variance (or 27.7% of total variance), was significant. All criterion variables were substantial
contributors to the synthetic criterion variate, possessing standardized coefficients greater than
|.40| (see Table 3). For the set of predictor variables, only the Rational subscale of the RationalExperiential Inventory and self-reported political ideology were substantial contributors to the
synthetic predictor variate, possessing standardized coefficients greater than |.56|.
These results supported my hypothesis about the positive relationship between analytical
thinking and agreement with scientific claims (H1a). My hypotheses about the relationship
between intuitive thinking, conspiracy ideation, and agreement with scientific claims (H1b-c)
were not supported. The measures of intuitive thinking style and conspiracy ideation were not
substantial contributors to the synthetic predictor variate, although their correlations with the
synthetic predictor variate, the structure coefficient in Table 3, were sizeable and significant (r =
-.36 and r = -.41, respectively). My hypotheses regarding the relationship between agreement
with scientific claims and political ideology (H1d-e) were only partially supported. Political
conservatism was related to lower levels of agreement with scientific claims across all domains,
whereas political liberalism was related to higher levels of agreement with each claim. My
hypothesis about the relationship between religiosity and agreement with the evolution item
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Table 3
Standardized Function and Structure Coefficients for the First
Canonical Variate
Predictors
Conspiracy Mentality
REI Rational
REI Intuitive
Religious Services
Political Ideology

Standardized
-0.29
-0.57*
-0.22
-0.17
-0.56*

Structure
-0.41**
-0.63**
-0.36**
-0.28
-0.70**

0.51*
0.40*
0.48*
0.41*

0.64**
0.40**
0.59**
0.57**

Criteria
Evolution
Climate Change
Genetically Modified Foods
Vaccines

Note. * substantial contributors to the synthetic variate
** significantly correlated to the synthetic variate
REI = Rational-Experiential Inventory

(H1f) was unsupported. The measure of religiosity was nether a substantial contributor to the
synthetic predictor variate, nor was it significantly correlated with the synthetic variate.
These results stand in contrast to stereotypical portrayals of particular scientific
conclusions (e.g., climate change, evolution) being rejected by conservatives, with others (e.g.,
GMO safety, vaccine safety) being rejected by liberals. Participants with stronger conservative
leanings simply tended to report lower agreement with politicized scientific claims than
participants with stronger liberal leanings.
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Belief Justifications
Table 4 shows the frequency of belief justification codes. Across all four scientific topics,
the most frequent justification was a reference to data (21.0% of responses). Responses varied in
the amount of detail participants provided when describing data. Some responses were specific,
such as “All the studies related to negative side effects of vaccines have shown that they do no
damage but protect from viruses” (participant 59) where the participant specifically references
scientific research on alleged negative side effects of childhood vaccinations. Other participants
referenced data in a more generic fashion, such as “I do believe in evolution because scientific
facts make evolution easy to believe in” (participant 12), where the participant does not indicate
any specific “scientific facts” that make evolution “easy to believe in.” References to data were
most frequently found in participant responses to the Vaccine item (37.14% of Data codes), and
least likely to occur in response to the GMO item (17.46% of Data codes).
Following appeals to data, qualifications and clarifications were the second most
common response type (10.1% of responses). These responses merely served to further specify
the participant’s response rather than justify participant’s responses. An example of this type of
response is, “I agree that they are largely safe but I don't know if all of them are as effective as
they state they are” (participant 71). On the subject of the safety and efficacy of childhood
vaccines, this participant’s response clarifies agreement with safety rather than both safety and
efficacy. Referencing some empirical mechanism related to the topic (e.g., Participant 90’s
response to the Climate Change item, “People contribute with the use of oil and coal”) was the
third most frequently occurring response (9.1% of responses). Belief-based or circular responses
were the fourth most common response (8.0% of responses). These types of responses also
occurred as either generic (e.g., “Because it's true”, participant 2 responding to why they hold
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Table 4
Frequency of Belief Justification Codes for Four Science Topics

Justification Code
Non-justification
Clarification / Qualification
Don't Know
None (explicitly stated)
Subjective
Logical
Moral
Religious
Cultural Identity
Experience
Belief-based / Circular
Knowledge / Education
Conspiracy ideation
Controversy
Indifference / Don't care
Natural
Personal Choice
Evidential
Data
Mechanism
Deferential
Scientist / Science
Teacher / Class / Textbook
Other
Vague
Total
No Answer (empty response)

Evolution Climate
Change

Topic
GMOs Vaccines

Total

25
5
1

47
6
1

50
33
0

30
7
0

152
51
2

7
0
69
1
1
37
11
0
16
1
0
2

2
10
2
0
9
30
13
0
4
0
41
0

12
13
0
9
14
30
53
11
11
0
50
1

4
16
1
18
36
24
19
5
29
0
2
4

25
39
72
28
60
121
96
16
60
1
93
7

68
29

75
62

55
20

117
26

315
137

21
21
3
6
324
17

17
9
10
6
344
22

9
3
17
4
395
16

13
1
6
4
362
18

60
34
36
20
1425
73
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their position on the claim that childhood vaccines are safe and effective) or specific (e.g.,
“Genetically modified foods are safe and can be more beneficial for consumption”, participant
23) responses.
A chi-squared goodness-of-fit analysis was conducted to assess the frequency of response
types in comparison to the frequency of response types found in prior research (Shtulman, 2013).
Because the present coding scheme was more nuanced than the coding scheme developed by
Shtulman (see Figure 1), several categories in the present scheme were combined so that
comparisons could be made (see Methods section in Chapter II). Results of the chi-squared test
revealed that the present data significantly differed from the expected frequencies, χ2 (3, 1420) =
6042.93, p < .001. As shown in Table 5, there was a higher proportion of Non-justifications and
Subjective responses and a lower proportion of Deferential responses in the present study
compared to Shtulman’s (2013) study, whereas there was a similar proportion of Evidential
responses. These results indicate that justifications that could be considered scientifically or
philosophically appropriate (i.e., Evidential and Deferential) were less frequent than participant
responses that were either scientifically or philosophically inappropriate (i.e., Subjective) or were
not justifications. These results support my hypothesis (H2a).
Table 6 shows the frequency and proportion of participants with justification codes across
the four topics. What is revealing from these data is how infrequently participants justified their
beliefs about scientific claims in a consistent manner. Even when looking only at the higherorder category level, participants were unlikely to justify their beliefs about the four topics the
same way. Only 19 participants (7.9%) referenced some evidential justification, such as
empirical data or causal mechanism, in each of their responses to the four scientific claims.
Thirty-one participants (13%) referenced some subjective justification for all four topics.
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Table 5
Comparison of Proportions of Justification Types
Between Shtulman (2013) and Present Study
Justification Type
Non-justifications
Subjective
Evidential
Deferential

Shtulman (2013)
.01
.17
.29
.53

Present Study
.20
.43
.28
.09

Examining Tables 4 and 6 together illustrate interesting patterns of belief justification,
though not all of them are surprising. For instance, 95.6% of justifications referencing religion
occurred for only one topic. This is not surprising given that, of the four topics presently studied,
only the topic of evolution has been framed to the general public in a manner that pits science
against religion. In contrast, appeals to nature were also most likely to occur for only one topic,
but were split roughly equivalently between the Climate Change and the GMO items. Responses
that were coded as appeals to nature took one of two forms. One was the naturalistic fallacy, the
logical fallacy implying that what is natural is better than what is artificial, illustrated in this
response from participant 194 regarding GMOs, “I feel that food in its most natural state is the
most nutritious.” The other form appeals to nature took appeared to diminish the significance of
human activity, as though humans are not able to influence nature. This idea is illustrated in the
response by participant 281 regarding Climate Change: “I believe that the earth goes through
periods of climate shift naturally. While humans may not be helping our enviornment [sic], I do
not believe we are speeding up warming or cooling.” This pattern of appealing to nature is
somewhat surprising considering vaccines are artificial, and biological evolution occurs
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Table 6
Frequency (Proportion) of Participants’ Use of Each Justification Code for None, Any,
or All Scientific Topics

Non-justification
Clarification / Qualification
Don't Know
No Answer (empty response)
None (explicitly stated)
Subjective
Logical
Moral
Religious
Cultural Identity
Experience
Belief-based / Circular
Knowledge / Education
Conspiracy ideation
Controversy
Indifference / Don't care
Natural
Personal Choice
Evidential Justifications
Data / evidence
Mechanism
Deferential Justifications
Scientist / Science
Teacher / Class / Textbook
Other
Vague

0 topics
82 (.34)
129 (.54)
190 (.79)
208 (.87)
238 (1.00)
30 (.13)
215 (.90)
200 (.84)
170 (.71)
214 (.90)
189 (.79)
149 (.62)
162 (.68)
223 (.93)
188 (.79)
238 (1.00)
158 (.66)
232 (.97).
46 (.19)
69 (.29)
135 (.56)
144 (.60)
189 (.79)
211 (.88)
207 (.87)
221 (.92)

1 topic
86 (.36)
75 (.31)
47 (.20)
10 (.04)
0 (.00)
54 (.23)
23 (.10)
39 (.16)
66 (.28)
22 (.09)
41 (.17)
63 (.26)
63 (.26)
16 (.07)
44 (.18)
1 (.00)
70 (.29)
7 (.03)
68 (.28)
75 (.31)
76 (.32)
71 (.30)
43 (.18)
23 (.10)
28 (.12)
17 (.07)

2 topics
41 (.17)
29 (.12)
2 (.01)
7 (.03)
1 (.00)
64 (.27)
1 (.00)
0 (.00)
3 (.01)
3 (.01)
8 (.03)
23 (.10)
9 (.04)
0 (.00)
5 (.02)
0 (.00)
10 (.04)
0 (.00)
65 (.27)
55 (.23)
23 (.10)
17 (.07)
5 (.02)
4 (.02)
4 (.02)
0 (.00)

3 topics
19 (.08)
5 (.02)
0 (.00)
7 (.03)
0 (.00)
60 (.25)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
1 (.00)
4 (.02)
5 (.02)
0 (.00)
2 (.01)
0 (.00)
1 (.00)
0 (.00)
41 (.17)
30 (.13)
5 (.02)
6 (.03)
1 (.00)
1 (.00)
0 (.00)
1 (.00)

4 topics
11 (.05)
1 (.00)
0 (.00)
7 (.03)
0 (.00)
31 (.13)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
19 (.08)
10 (.04)
0 (.00)
1 (.00)
1 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)

naturally. Were people to justify their beliefs more consistently, an appeal to nature should have
occurred more evenly across topics, regardless of whether participants agreed or disagreed with
the scientific claim presented, because each topic has a direct connection to concepts of nature.
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Belief Refutations
Table 7 shows the frequency of belief refutation codes. In contrast to my prediction that
the most common refutation response would be denial (H3), the modal refutation response was
instead an appeal to further evidence, data, or research. As with the justifications, the coding
scheme developed did not differentiate between referring to evidence generally or specifically.
Such responses took the form of general appeals to evidence, such as “If there was scientific
evidence that evolution didn't explain the evolution of species of life” (participant 162), or
specific appeals to evidence, such as “Proof that the ozone isn't shrinking due to human abuse”
(participant 37).
As with the belief justifications, a chi-squared goodness-of-fit analysis was conducted to
assess the frequency of response types in comparison to the frequency of response types found in
prior research (Shtulman, 2013). Results of the chi-squared test revealed that the present data
significantly differed from the expected frequencies, χ2 (3, 880) = 545.91, p < .001. As shown in
Table 8, there was a higher proportion of Subjective and Evidential refutations and a lower
proportion of Deferential refutations in the present study compared to Shtulman’s (2013) study,
whereas there was a similar proportion of Denial responses. These results refute my hypothesis
(H4a) that refutations that could be considered philosophically or scientifically appropriate (i.e.,
Evidential and Deferential) would occur less frequently than inappropriate refutations (i.e.,
Denial and Subjective).
Table 9 shows the frequency with which participants used each code across the four
topics. Nearly half (49%) of participants explicitly stated that for at least one topic, nothing
would change their position, with 21% of participants asserting this for more than one topic.
Interestingly, participants were most likely to explicitly state nothing would change their position
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Table 7
Frequency of Refutation Codes for Four Scientific Topics
Topic
Refutation Code
Denial
Subjective
Logical
Moral
Religious
Cultural Identity
Experience
Belief-based / Circular
Knowledge / Education
Conspiracy ideation
Controversy
Indifference / Don't care
Natural
Personal Choice
Counterfactual hindsight bias
Answering for others
Evidential
Data
Mechanism
Unrealistic
Methodological
Deferential
Scientist / Science
Teacher / Class / Textbook
Other
Clarification / Qualification
Don't Know
Vague
Total
No Answer (empty response)

Evolution

GMOs

Vaccines

Total

72

Climate
Change
51

25

39

187

0
0
36
0
1
0
14
0
1
0
0
0
1
3

0
0
0
2
1
1
16
1
0
0
2
0
21
1

0
0
0
0
5
1
42
6
2
1
0
0
14
1

0
1
0
0
14
0
8
4
3
0
0
0
6
3

0
1
36
2
21
2
80
11
6
1
2
0
42
8

70
12
10
0

95
11
5
0

109
2
0
6

126
3
8
8

400
28
23
14

5
0
2
5
9
6
247
22

10
0
4
4
5
10
240
29

5
0
9
3
1
7
239
27

5
0
5
2
1
5
241
24

25
0
20
14
16
28
967
102
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on the topic of evolution compared to the other topics. A large majority of participants (82%)
indicated that for at least one topic, some form of evidential challenge to their position would get
them to consider changing their mind, with 13% of participants stating as much for all four
topics. Beyond that particular instance, and similar to the belief justification responses, this again
illustrates the inconsistency with which participants respond when asked about different
scientific topics. For instance, a religiously based challenge to their belief was referenced by
15% of participants, and examining Table 7 reveals this type of refutation only applies for
changing peoples’ minds about evolution.

Table 8
Comparison of Proportions of Refutation Types
Between Shtulman (2013) and Present Study
Refutation Type
Denial
Subjective
Evidential
Deferential

Shtulman (2013)
.21
.10
.30
.39

Present Study
.21
.24
.50
.05

Although the coding schemes for the belief justifications and belief refutations are nearly
identical, there are two notable exceptions. First, refutations occasionally took the form of a
peculiar form of hindsight bias presented as a counterfactual. For instance, Participant 6
responded to the climate change refutation question that challenging his or her position on
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Table 9
Frequency (Proportion) of Participants’ Use of Each Refutation Code for None, Any,
or All Scientific Topics

Denial
Subjective Refutations
Logical
Moral
Religious
Cultural Identity
Experience
Belief-based / Circular
Knowledge / Education
Conspiracy ideation
Controversy
Indifference / Don't care
Natural
Personal Choice
Counterfactual hindsight bias
Answering for others
Evidential Refutations
Data/evidence
Mechanism
Unrealistic
Methodological
Deferential Refutations
Scientist / Science
Teacher / Class / Textbook
Other
Clarification / Qualification
Don't Know
Vague
No Answer (empty response)

0 topics
121 (.51)
109 (.46)
239 (1.00)
238 (1.00)
203 (.85)
237 (.99)
222 (.93)
237 (.99)
181 (.76)
228 (.95)
233 (.97)
238 (1.00)
237 (.99)
239 (1.00)
202 (.85)
234 (.98)
44 (.18)
50 (.21)
213 (.89)
217 (.91)
227 (.95)
208 (.87)
223 (.93)
239 (1.00)
223 (.93)
225 (.94)
223 (.93)
218 (.91)
197 (.82)

1 topic
67 (.28)
86 (.36)
0 (.00)
1 (.00)
36 (.15)
2 (.01)
13 (.05)
2 (.01)
44 (.18)
11 (.05)
6 (.03)
1 (.00)
2 (.01)
0 (.00)
33 (.14)
4 (.02)
58 (.24)
62 (.26)
24 (.10)
21 (.09)
10 (.04)
20 (.08)
10 (.04)
0 (.00)
12 (.05)
14 (.06)
16 (.07)
17 (.07)
12 (.04)

2 topics
38 (.16)
24 (.10)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
4 (.02)
0 (.00)
7(.03)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
3 (.01)
0 (.00)
65 (.27)
64 (.27)
2 (.01)
1 (.00)
2 (.01)
8 (.03)
3(.01)
0 (.00)
4 (.02)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
1 (.00)
10 (.04)

3 topics
8 (.03)
16 (.07)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
6 (.03)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
1 (.00)
0 (.00)
40 (.17)
42 (.18)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
3 (.01)
3 (.01)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
3 (.01)
10 (.04)

4 topics
5 (.02)
4 (.02)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
1 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
1 (.00)
32 (.13)
21 (.09)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
10 (.04)

climate change would require “If people came together and tried to end climate change.” If taken
at face value, the logic of this response is that if humans addressed the problem of climate
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change, this participant would stop believing in anthropogenic climate change. This is somewhat
of a nonsensical response, because in order to change their position that human activity is a
factor in climate change, human activity would be needed to reverse the pattern of climate
change currently observed. Fifteen percent of participants made similar such declarations for at
least one of the topics. As shown in Table 6, this kind of reasoning occurred at least once for
each topic, though occurred most frequently in responses to the climate change item. The second
additional code for the refutation question responses, although it occurred very infrequently,
emerged because some participants provided refutation responses about what they think would
change the minds of other people, rather than what would change their mind.
Predictors of Justification and Refutation Types
Multiple regression analyses with participants’ level of agreement with the four scientific
topics entered as predictor variables and the major qualitative code categories (i.e., nonjustifications, subjective justifications, evidential justifications, deferential justifications, denial,
subjective refutations, evidential refutations, and deferential refutations) entered as criterion
variables were conducted to examine whether participants’ level of agreement with each of the
four scientific claims was related to the types of open-ended responses the provided across all
four topics (see Tables 10 and 11). Only statistically significant models will be discussed.
Participants who included more non-justifications in their responses had lower levels of
agreement with the climate change and vaccine items, F(4, 234) = 5.44, p < .001. Participants
who included more evidential justifications in their responses had higher levels of agreement
with all four scientific claims, F(4, 234) = 12.38, p < .001. Participants who included more
deferential justifications in their responses had higher levels of agreement with the evolution,
GMO, and vaccine items, F(4, 234) = 4.69, p = .001. Participants who included more evidential
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Table 10
Frequency of Justifications Predicted by Level of Agreement with Scientific Claims
NonSubjective
Justifications*
Predictors
β
t
β
t
Evolution
-.10
-1.51
-.13
-1.97
Climate change -.20
-3.14** .002
.03
GMO
-.04
-.666
-.02
-.35
Vaccines
-.15
-2.33*
-.03
-.49
Note: N = 239, * p < .05. ** p <.01. *** p < .001

Evidential*
β
.18
.22
.21
.15

t
3.04**
3.60***
3.35**
2.51*

Deferential*
β
.18
.08
.16
.02

t
2.86**
1.21
2.36*
.24

Regression models with * are significant at p < .05 level
GMO = Genetically modified organisms

refutations in their responses had higher levels of agreement with the evolution and climate
change items, F(4, 234) = 6.59, p < .001. Finally, participants who included more deferential
refutations in their responses had higher levels of agreement with the climate change item, F(4,
234) = 2.95, p = .021.
Taken together, these results illustrate the relationship between participants’ beliefs about
science and their explicit reasoning about their beliefs. Greater agreement with scientific claims
corresponds to a higher likelihood of references to objective sources of justification, such as
evidence or deference to a perceived authority, supporting H2b. A lower level of agreement with
some scientific claims, specifically claims regarding climate change and vaccines, correspond to
a higher likelihood of responses that do not actually justify the belief. Likewise, for participant
responses about possible challenges to their belief, higher agreement with scientific claims,
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Table 11
Frequency of Refutations Predicted by Level of Agreement with Scientific Claims
Denial

Subjective
Predictors
β
t
β
t
Evolution
-.05
-.83
-.17
-2.62
Climate change .06
.93
-.08
-1.29
GMO
-.08
-1.19
.04
.65
Vaccines
-.02
-.33
.03
.46
Note: N = 239, * p < .05. ** p <.01. *** p < .001

Evidential*
β
t
.22
3.41***
.15
2.34*
.12
1.87
.06
.93

Deferential*
β
t
.12
1.78
.13
2.05*
.08
1.12
.07
1.07

Regression models with * are significant at p < .05 level
GMO = Genetically modified organisms

particularly those about evolution and climate change, corresponded to more references to
objective sources of refutation, such as contradictory evidence or deferring to changing views of
experts, supporting H4b. These results suggest a connection between agreement with science and
awareness of what constitutes valid or appropriate reasoning for scientific conclusions. That is to
say, it is potentially the case that individuals who agree more strongly with scientific claims may
better understand the epistemological commitments of science better than individuals who
disagree with scientific claims.
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CHAPTER IV: GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study was designed to expand on prior research on variables that influence
agreement with scientific claims by examining what reasons people provide for their beliefs on
politically polarized socio-scientific issues. The gap between how the general public and
professional scientists accept certain scientific issues, such as those explored here, is large (Funk
& Rainie, 2015), and efforts to improve acceptance of science by addressing an assumed
information deficit in the public are not always effective (Gauchat, 2012; Kahan, 2006; Miller,
2001). Instead, researchers have found better predictors of the acceptance of various scientific
claims in social, cognitive, and personality variables such as cognitive style, religious affiliation,
political ideology, and cultural worldview (Gervais, 2015; Kahan 2015; Lewandowsky et al.,
2013a; Lindeman, 2011; Lobato et al., 2014; Majima, 2015; Nisbet et al., 2015; Shen & Gromet,
2015). One substantial gap in the literature is an examination of the reasons people provide for
their beliefs regarding scientific conclusions. The present study adds to that literature.
Findings from this study supported the following hypotheses: (H1a) A greater
predisposition towards an analytical (i.e., Type 2) cognitive style predicted a higher level of
agreement with scientific claims; (H2a) For all topics and all levels of agreement, there were
fewer scientifically acceptable justifications compared to justifications that were not
scientifically or philosophically acceptable across; (H2b) Higher levels of agreement with a
scientific claim predicted the use of a scientifically or philosophically acceptable justification;
and (H4b) Higher levels of agreement with a scientific claim predicted refutations that were
scientifically or philosophically acceptable.
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Only partial support was found for the following hypotheses: (H1d-e) Stronger political
conservatism predicted a lower level of agreement with all four scientific claims relative to
political liberalism rather than conservatives expressing lower agreement with claims about
evolution and climate change relative to GMO safety and vaccine safety and liberals expressing
lower agreement with GMO safety and vaccine safety relative to agreement with evolution and
climate change.
No support was found for the following hypotheses: (H1b) A greater predisposition
towards an intuitive (i.e., Type 1) cognitive style did not predict a lower level of agreement with
scientific claims; (H1c) A greater predisposition to conspiracy ideation did not predict a lower
level of agreement with scientific claims; (H1f) More frequent attendance of religious services
did not predict a lower level of agreement with scientific claims about evolution; (H3) Denial
was not the most common refutation response; (H4a) Scientifically or philosophically acceptable
refutations were not less frequent refutation responses than refutations that are not scientifically
or philosophically.
The following hypotheses were unable to be examined: (H2c; H4c) Due to low internal
reliability, I could not use participant scores on the Cultural Worldview Scale to predict their
justifications and refutations.
Findings from the canonical correlation analysis showed that lower agreement with all
four scientific statements was predicted by a low analytical thinking style, as measured by the
Rational-Experiential Inventory (Norris & Epstein, 2013), and self-reported political
conservatism. However, this result may only hold for politicized scientific topics or topics that
are considered controversial outside of their respective disciplines, such as the ones studied here.
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With this cautionary interpretation in mind, the present results do hint at two ways in
which these topics can be discussed or taught in a manner that may improve agreement with
scientific consensus. First, educators and pop culture science advocates may wish to present and
discuss these topics in a way that diminishes any association with a socio-political identity.
Instead, presentation of these topics could, for instance, only attempt to stick to the data so as not
to make salient a potentially anti-scientific aspect of one’s individual or group identity. This
suggestion aligns with the conclusions by Shen and Gromet (2015) regarding framing of a less
controversial domain of science. They found lower support for the discipline of neurolaw among
Republicans when the issue was framed in a way that benefits the defense side of criminal law
than when the issue was framed as benefiting criminal prosecutors or was framed in a neutral
fashion. The manner in which scientific topics are framed may be more influential in how people
think about a topic than what the topic itself simply is. Second, the present results imply a need
for better training and education to encourage people to rely more on a reflective, effortful,
analytic style of thinking when considering scientific topics. Adopting the perspective of a
scientist, a profession where reflective and analytical thinking is encouraged, has been linked to
better performance on physics tasks (Amsel & Johnson, 2008). A more explicit educational
curriculum that teaches people what thinking like a scientist entails, how to adopt the identity of
a scientist, and what the culture of science is may be beneficial for improving scientific literacy
(see also Wynne, 2006).
Curiously, the Cultural Worldview Scale did not reach acceptable standards of internal
reliability in the present sample, precluding analysis of the relationship between cultural
worldview and agreement with scientific claims. The lack of internal reliability for this measure
is potentially due to differences in sample characteristics between the present sample and those

40

used by Kahan and colleagues (2007, 2009, 2012) when developing the scale. Samples recruited
in Kahan and colleagues’ studies were either large (exceeding 1,500 participants; see Kahan et
al., 2007, 2009) or were more representative of the general population than the present sample
(e.g., Kahan et al., 2009, 2012). By contrast, the present sample size was more modest (N = 244),
and was comprised of undergraduate students and university staff. Cronbach’s alpha is a
parameter representing the ratio of the sum of item variance to the total score variance (Streiner,
2003). A large, heterogeneous sample is more likely to produce high alpha estimates simply
because heterogeneous samples increase the variance of the total scores. Cronbach’s alpha
allows researchers to estimate measurement error within a given sample, such that as reliability
increases the amount of variance attributable to measurement error for the sample decreases
(Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). This is done by squaring the reliability parameter and subtracting
from 1. The Cultural Worldview Scale subscale reliabilities were .52 for the IndividualismCommunitarianism subscale and .59 for the Hierarchical-Egalitarianism subscale, resulting in
variance attributable to measurement error for each subscale as 83% and 65% respectively. I
considered this unacceptably high and, therefore, was unable to use participants’ scores on
Cultural Worldview Scale to examine H2c and H4c.
Beyond providing additional data about the relationship between individual difference
variables and acceptance or rejection of science, the present study was also designed to help fill a
gap in the literature on why people hold the beliefs they do about scientific claims (see also,
Kuhn, 1991). Novel to the present study is a qualitative examination of why people say they
accept or reject scientific claims. Little research has attempted to investigate this aspect of beliefs
about science (e.g., Shtulman, 2013), but comparison between prior research and the present
study can still be made.
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Shtulman (2013) reported findings that showed people tend to reason about beliefs in
scientific and various non-scientific (e.g., paranormal, religious) phenomena similarly. Largely,
participants in his study justified their beliefs by deferring to other sources of information, such
as authority figures, sacred texts, experts, and teachers. In the present study, participants justified
their position on scientific claims largely by referring to subjective sources of information, such
as personal experience (or lack thereof) with the phenomena, their own knowledge (or lack
thereof) about the topic, circular reasoning, cultural and religious identity, or appeals to nature.
Referencing some form of empirical source of evidence, such as evidence or causal mechanism,
was the second most frequent type of response. Additionally, there were significantly more
clarification and qualification non-justifications in the present study relative to those found in
Shtulman’s research. These differences in the pattern of results between Shtulman’s research and
the present study are likely due to the different topics participants responded to. Shtulman
examined peoples’ justifications for belief in the existence of particular phenomena, such as
electrons, genes, or evolution. By contrast, here I examined peoples’ justifications for their level
of agreement with scientific conclusions, such as evolutionary theory being the best current
explanation for the existence of the variety of species or that medical research has shown that
childhood vaccinations are largely safe and effective. This difference may predispose people to
think of the topic in a more complex fashion, because level of agreement with scientific
conclusions on these topics does have some connection to policy positions people take. These
socio-scientific issues are related to peoples’ opinions on what material should be taught in
science classrooms, what kind of industrial regulations or environmental protections should be
adopted, what kind of information for customers should be provided on food packaging, and
what kind of healthcare policies for child care should be in place. This may explain the large
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difference in proportion of clarifications between the two studies. Here, the prompts that
participants responded to may have primed participants to elaborate more on their specific
beliefs than what could be conveyed by a simple Likert-response, in contrast to a question
inquiring about belief in just the existence or non-existence of phenomena.
Results from this qualitative analysis also demonstrate some of the ways in which
scientific claims, particularly allegedly controversial claims, are thought of by non-specialists.
Though participants in this study reasoned across these scientific claims in a largely inconsistent
fashion, there were topic-specific patterns of reasoning that emerged. For evolution, it was
common for participants to reference religion in some fashion, both in their justifications for or
against the claim and in their thinking about possible refutations. On the topic of climate change,
participants referenced the natural state of the climate. For genetically modified organisms,
participants commonly made reference to the idea that what is natural is inherently better than
what is artificial as well as referencing their own level of knowledge regarding the topic.
Regarding the topic of vaccines, participants commonly made subjective justifications such as
direct experience and referencing the topic as controversial. Strategies for promoting improved
scientific literacy should be developed with the awareness of how people think about these
topics, although it should be noted that the specific wording of the scientific claims used in this
survey may have differentially primed different ways in which participants responded to the
open-ended questions. For instance, in the Evolution item, the phrase “best explanation” may
have primed individuals to think about prospective explanations, of which religiously based
explanations (e.g., creationism or intelligent design) are commonly associated. For the Climate
Change item, the phrase “human activity is contributing to” might have primed participants to
think in terms of causal mechanism. Future research in this area may be able to explore this
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potential confound by wording scientific conclusions for participants to respond to differently,
either by being as neutral as possible or by deliberately wording statements in such a way as to
prime other justifications.
In sum, the present study is a necessary step towards filling a large gap in the research on
attitudes and beliefs about science. The research was designed to further investigate individual
difference variables that might be predict agreement with science, as well as to provide needed
qualitative research to explore in more detail the reasons people provide for their beliefs about
scientific topics. An analytical cognitive style and stronger political liberalism were predictive of
higher agreement with all four scientific claims studied. Higher agreement with scientific claims
regarding evolution, climate change, GMOs, and vaccines was also related to a greater frequency
of referencing justifications and refutations that are more scientifically or philosophically valid
forms of reasoning, such as appealing to evidence or deferring to expertise. Furthermore,
participants in the present study were found to reason inconsistently across all four topics,
providing unique clusters of response types for the different topics. Additionally, the findings
illustrate the need for further qualitative research into the development and maintenance of
attitudes about science. Being able to tailor education about science to the manner in which
people think about science may improve scientific literacy, but doing so requires more research
into why people hold the beliefs they do about science.
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APPENDIX A: SCIENTIFIC ITEMS SURVEY
Instructions: This is a brief survey of your own beliefs and attitudes on a variety of subjects of
public, political, and scientific interest. There are no correct or incorrect answers. We are only
interested in your opinions about these topics. Please rate how much you agree or disagree with
the following statements on a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 indicates that you do not agree with the
statement at all and 6 indicates that you completely agree with the statement. After responding to
each statement, you will be asked to answer two open-ended questions.

1) Biological evolution is the best explanation for explaining the varieties of species of life.
1

2

3

4

5

6

(I do not

(I agree

agree with

completely

this statement

with this

at all)

statement)

1a) What are your reasons for your position on this topic? (open-ended)
1b) What possible reasons can you think of that would change your position on [topic]?
(open-ended)

2) The earth is experiencing a period of global climate change that human activity is contributing
to.
1

2

3

4

5

6

(I do not

(I agree

agree with

completely
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this statement

with this

at all)

statement)

2a) What are your reasons for your position on this topic? (open-ended)
2b) What possible reasons can you think of that would change your position on [topic]?
(open-ended)

3) Genetically modified foods (also known as GM or GMO foods) are largely safe for human
consumption.
1

2

3

4

5

6

(I do not

(I agree

agree with

completely

this statement

with this

at all)

statement)

3a) What are your reasons for your position on this topic? (open-ended)
3b) What possible reasons can you think of that would change your position on [topic]?
(open-ended)

4) Medical research has demonstrated that childhood vaccinations are largely safe and effective.
1

2

3

4

5

6

(I do not

(I agree

agree with

completely

this statement

with this

at all)

statement)
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4a) What are your reasons for your position on this topic? (open-ended)
4b) What possible reasons can you think of that would change your position on [topic]?
(open-ended)
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APPENDIX B: RATIONAL-EXPERIENTIAL INVENTORY (NORRIS & EPSTEIN, 2011)
Instructions – Please select the response that best corresponds to the way you feel concerning the
following questions or statements.
1 I enjoy problems that require hard thinking.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

2 I am not very good in solving problems that require careful logical analysis.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

4

5
Strongly Agree

4

5
Strongly Agree

3 I enjoy intellectual challenges.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

4 I prefer complex to simple problems.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

3

5 I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

3

6 Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

7 I am not a very analytical thinker.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

8 I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

3

4
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5
Strongly Agree

9 I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

10 I have a logical mind.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

11 Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

12 Knowing the answer without understanding the reasoning behind it is good enough for me.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

3

4

5

13 I enjoy reading things that evoke visual images.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

14 I enjoy imagining things.
1

2

Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

15 I can clearly picture or remember some sculpture or natural object (not alive) that I think is
very beautiful.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

16 I identify strongly with characters in movies or books I read.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

17 I tend to describe things by using images or metaphors, or creative comparisons.
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1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

18 Art is really important to me.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

19 Sometimes I like to just sit back and watch things happen.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

20 I have favorite poems and paintings that mean a lot to me.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

21 When I travel or drive anywhere, I always watch the landscape and scenery.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

22 I almost never think in visual images.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

23 My emotions don’t make much difference in my life.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

24 Emotions don’t really mean much: they come and go.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

25 When I have a strong emotional experience, the effect stays with me for a long time.
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1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

26 When I’m sad, it’s often a very strong feeling.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

27 Things that make me feel emotional don’t seem to affect other people as much.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

28 Everyday experiences often evoke strong feelings in me.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

29 I’d rather be upset sometimes and happy sometimes, than always feel calm.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

30 I don’t react emotionally to scary movies or books as much as most people do.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

31 My anger is often very intense.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

32 When I’m happy, the feeling is usually more like contentment than like exhilaration or
excitement.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree
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33 I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

34 I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

35 I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on ones intuition for important decisions.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

36 I trust my initial feelings about people.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

37 I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

38 I enjoy learning by doing something, instead of figuring it out first.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

39 I can often tell how people feel without them having to say anything.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

40 I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree
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41 For me, descriptions of actual people’s experiences are more convincing than discussions
about ‘‘facts.’’
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

42 I’m not a very spontaneous person.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree
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APPENDIX C: CULTURAL WORLDVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE (KAHAN ET AL., 2012)
A. Individualism
Instructions – People in our society often disagree about how far to let individuals go in making
decisions for themselves. How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of these statements?
[Possible responses: strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree,
moderately agree, strongly agree]
1. The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives.
2. Sometimes the government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting themselves.
3. It’s not the government’s business to try to protect people from themselves.
4. The government should stop telling people how to live their lives.
5. The government should do more to advance society’s goals, even if that means limiting the
freedom and choices of individuals.
6. Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don’t get in the
way of what’s good for society.
B. Hierarchy
Instructions – People in our society often disagree about issues of equality and discrimination.
How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of these statements?
[Possible responses: strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree,
moderately agree, strongly agree]
1. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.
2. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal.
3. We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and people
of color, and men and women.
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4. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society.
5. It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals and other groups don’t want equal rights, they want
special rights just for them.
6. Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine.
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APPENDIX D: CONSPIRACY MENTALITY QUESTIONNAIRE (BRUDER ET AL., 2013)
Instructions: For each of the statements below, please use the respective rating scale to indicate
how likely it is in your opinion that the statement is true. Remember that there are no
“objectively” right or wrong answers and that we are interested in your personal opinion.
1) I think that many very important things happen in the world, which the public is never informed about.
0%

10%

20%

certainly

extremely

very

not

unlikely

unlikely

30%

40%

50%

60%

unlikely

somewhat

undecided

somewhat

unlikely

70%
likely

likely

80%

90%

100%

very

extremely

certain

likely

likely

2) I think that politicians usually do not tell us the true motives for their decisions.
0%

10%

20%

certainly

extremely

very

not

unlikely

unlikely

30%

40%

50%

60%

unlikely

somewhat

undecided

somewhat

unlikely

70%
likely

likely

80%

90%

100%

very

extremely

certain

likely

likely

3) I think that government agencies closely monitor all citizens.
0%

10%

20%

certainly

extremely

very

not

unlikely

unlikely

30%

40%

50%

60%

unlikely

somewhat

undecided

somewhat

unlikely

70%
likely

likely

80%

90%

100%

very

extremely

certain

likely

likely

4) I think that events which superficially seem to lack a connection are often the result of secret activities.
0%

10%

20%

certainly

extremely

very

not

unlikely

unlikely

30%

40%

50%

60%

unlikely

somewhat

undecided

somewhat

unlikely

70%
likely

likely

80%

90%

100%

very

extremely

certain

likely

likely

5) I think that there are secret organizations that greatly influence political decisions.
0%

10%

20%

certainly

extremely

very

not

unlikely

unlikely

30%

40%

50%

60%

unlikely

somewhat

undecided

somewhat

unlikely

likely
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70%
likely

80%

90%

100%

very

extremely

certain

likely

likely

APPENDIX E: DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONNAIRE
What is your age? _____
What is your gender identity?
 Female
 Male
 Other (please specify)
What is your racial/ethnic background?
 Black, non-Hispanic: A person having origins in any of the Black racial groups of Africa
(except those of Hispanic origin)
 Hispanic: A person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central, or South America, or
other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race
 Asian or Pacific Islander: A person having origins in any of the original peoples of the
Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent or the Pacific Islands
 American Indian or Alaskan Native: A person having origins in any of the original
peoples of North America, and who maintains cultural identification through tribal
affiliation or community recognition
 White, non-Hispanic: A person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe,
North Africa, or the Middle East
 Other (please specify)
 Prefer not to answer
What is your current religious affiliation?
 Catholic
 Muslim
 Jewish
 Hindu
 Buddhist
 Protestant (e.g., Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, etc.)
 No religion (e.g., atheist, agnostic, etc.)
 Other (please specify)
 Prefer not to answer
How frequently do you attend religious services?
 Never
 At least once per year
 At least once per month
 At least once per week
 Every day
Overall, which best describes your current political ideology?
 Strongly liberal
 Moderately liberal
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Mildly liberal
Centrist
Mildly conservative
Moderately conservative
Strongly conservative
Other (please specify)
Prefer not to answer

What is your current political party affiliation?
 Democratic party
 Republican party
 Independent
 Other (please specify)
 Prefer not to answer
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APPENDIX F: CODING SCHEME FOR OPEN-ENDED RESPONSES
Justification Codes
Non-justification
Clarification/Qualification
Don't Know
None (explicitly stated)
Subjective
Logical
Moral

Religious
Cultural Identity

Experience

Belief-based / Circular
Knowledge / Education
Conspiracy ideation

Controversy
Indifference / Don't care

Natural
Personal Choice

Prototypical Example (Participant #, Topic)
I agree that they are largely safe but I don't know if all of
them are as effective as they state they are. (P71, Vaccines)
I don't know anything about GMOs (P8, GMOs)
N/A (P303, Evolution & Climate Change)
If they were not safe, they would not be put into the public
(P107, GMO)
I agree because we are causing this earth to suffer more than
what it has already suffer. Its up to us to change the problem
that we face in today society. (P183, Climate Change)
I am very strong on my religious views and do not believe in
biological evolution. (P53, Evolution)
I am very involved in nutrition and fitness lifestyles, and I
haven't heard of many cases of unsafe things happening to
people because of GMO foods. (P5, GMOs)
My only reason for agreeing with this statement is that my
whole family had childhood vaccinations and believe that it
has helped us all stay healthy. (P27, Vaccines)
Of course we affect our own environment. (P265, Climate
Change)
I dont really know anything about this topic. (P51, GMOs)
They have banned GMO's in many other countries and
America is completely ignorant to the horrible effects they
have because we are governed by a tiny group of people with
all of the money and power to make us blind and dumb.
(P135, GMOs)
I honestly have no idea. I can see both sides of the argument
and cannot seem to make my mind up. (P135, Vaccines)
I have been exposed to many scientific and religious
explanations for how we have gotten to this point in life, and
quite frankly, it is very overwhelming and I do not care
enough to form a strong position for that topic. (P82,
Evolution)
modification means processing which will change nature
food charchteristic (P213, GMOs)
I think that vaccines are important for the most part to keep
kids safe. I think that it is important that it is a choice with
certain vaccines because there are some vaccines that have
not been out long enough to have enough research done one
them and may not be necessary. (P148, Vaccines)
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Evidential Justifications
Data

Mechanism

Deferential
Scientist / Science
Teacher / Class / Textbook

Other

I agree with this statement because of the similarities that we
as humans have to other animals, as well as how many
animals are similar but because of where they live or come
from they have one distinct different feature that does puts
that at an advantage. (P149, Evolution)
Without evolution the species would not be able to adapt and
survive. they need to change and evolve as their environment
changes (P6, Evolution)
Because scientists have said that this is a problem. (P101,
Climate change)
I am in an Environmental Health class and we learned about
GMOs, I believe we learned more positives than negatives
about GMOs. (P125, GMOs)
News and everyone always encourages kids to get vaccines.
(P62, Vaccines)

Vague / Uncodable
No Answer (empty response)

Refutation Codes
Denial
Subjective Refutations
Logical
Moral

Religious
Cultural Identity

Experience
Belief-based / Circular

Knowledge / Education
Conspiracy ideation

Prototypical Example
My position will not change. (P18, Evolution)
(there were no responses coded with this code)
From all the things I have seen and read, it is far safer to
have the vaccine and perhaps inconclusively suffer some ill
effect than to allow thousands or perhaps more to die
needlessly in an outbreak. We all did fine with all the
vaccines when we were kids. (P207, Vaccines)
Some sort of religious proof would be the only thing that
would change my opinion. (P23, Evolution)
Scientific resarch, by actual scientists. Not by political hacks
or those paid by political hacks, to push an agenda (P281,
Climate Change)
If I or someone close to me has a negative experience with a
vaccine then I would be more concerned (P55, Vaccines)
Well obviously people eat GMO food everyday so I believe
it is okay to eat but I don't think it's the best option (P68,
GMOs)
Getting more information about the topic. (P24, GMOs)
I have to do more reading of the scientific literature. Again,
much of it is funded by the multinational corporations so
finding unbiased information isn't as easy as with other
topics. (P240, GMOs)
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Controversy

Looking more into the topic and looking at both sides (P21,
Vaccines)
Indifference / Don't care
I would have to read about it, I have never even been
interested or concerned about it. (P47, GMOs)
Natural
That the earth is suppose to be going through this period of
climate change, like it happens every 1 million years or
something. (P57, Climate Change)
Personal Choice
(there were no responses coded with this code)
Counterfactual hindsight bias If people actually cared enough about the environment and
taking care of the earth, then there is a possibility of me
changing my position on this topic. (P58, Climate Change)
Answering for others
Someone who is religious could argue that God created
different species. (P175, Evolution)
Evidential Refutations
Data/evidence
If there is evidence that says otherwise, then I'll change my
position. (P144, Climate Change)
Mechanism
The introduction/propagation of a cohesive theory of the
development of organisms that is better supported than the
theory of evolution. (P267, Evolution)
Unrealistic
If I magically acquired a time machine & I saw otherwise.
(P1, Evolution)
Methodological
If several sound studies using large numbers of participants
had same conclusions indicating questionable effectiveness
or safety I would possibly be swayed. (P257, Vaccines)
Deferential Refutations
Scientist / Science
If every scientist began saying there was a different reason
for the Earths temperature rise, then I would change my
mind. (P125, Climate Change)
Teacher / Class / Textbook
Other
If they were not approved by the FDA. (P181, GMOs)
Clarification / Qualification
This is a topic I am in the middle on. I don't know what
proof/reason could be provided to provide evidence on either
side of this argument. (P256, Evolution)
Don't Know
I don't know. (P226, Climate Change)
Vague / Uncodable
No Answer (empty response)

68

